Health & Fitness
May 14, 1962: The Soviet Missile Plan Remains Secret
Nuclear missiles to Cuba remain on the Kremlin's back burner—but the burner is on.
Nineteenth in a Series Chronicling the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962
In the 17th post in this series, we learned that in early May 1962 Alexei Alekseev, the KGB’s man in Havana, had been summoned to Moscow and appointed the USSR’s ambassador to Cuba. We pick up that story today.
Soviet Military Aid for Cuba—Still Conventional
On May 11, the Presidium approved a three-part letter which Alekseev would present to Fidel when he returned as ambassador. After repeating an invitation to Fidel to visit the USSR, the Presidium’s letter a) excused all Cuban debt; b) agreed to supply free of charge the “arms and ammunition…including missiles…” now being negotiated between the Cuban and Soviet governments; and c) offered, in response to a prior Cuban request, to send a delegation of experts on irrigation and land reclamation.
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At this stage in the story of the Crisis, the missiles mentioned in the letter would have been conventional weapons—not nukes.
White House Press Aide Visits Khrushchev
On May 12, Pierre Salinger, President Kennedy’s press secretary, visited Khrushchev at a dacha outside Moscow.
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The young press secretary knew that Khrushchev liked to use a Dr. Jekyll-Mr. Hyde technique to throw his opponents off balance. Salinger also knew that the Soviet leader used American visitors as conduits for messages to the White House and the State Department.
After a charmingly hospitable welcome to Salinger, Khrushchev accusingly brought up Kennedy’s March statement that the U.S. might have to “use the nuclear weapon at the start, come what may.”
Khrushchev roared that the USSR would launch a nuclear strike at the United States if NATO attacked East Germany. If Kennedy launched a first strike, the USSR would instantly retaliate.
Khrushchev neglected to point out what Salinger and the rest of the world knew: that he had then no way to make good his threat against the United States. He never mentioned Cuba.
The Pivotal Trip to Bulgaria—or Was It Pivotal?
On May 13, Khrushchev left on a week-long official visit to Bulgaria. It was during this trip that some sources, relying on Khrushchev’s memoirs, say that he first arrived at the decision to send strategic missiles to Cuba.
These observers recount the Soviet leader’s description of his growing worries about two threats to Cuba: first, that the U.S. might be spontaneously preparing to invade, though Moscow had no compelling evidence of this intention; or second, that Castro would somehow give the US a perfect excuse and opportunity to invade.
Khrushchev also agonized, according to his own account, that the economic and military aid proposed in the letter to Castro would be inadequate to deter an American invasion. But what else could he provide?
Sometime between May 13 and 20, Khrushchev says he decided that nuclear missiles were the obvious—and only—deterrent.
My Own Take
Partly because I strongly distrust the memoirs of great men, I continue to believe that Khrushchev decided in April to send missiles to Cuba. But sending Soviet missiles into the Western Hemisphere would be a very serious, indeed dangerous step. Khrushchev needed time to be sure his decision was sound. He took the first three weeks in May to make up his mind.
Khrushchev returned to Moscow on May 20.
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Sources
Alekseev’s appointment as ambassador and the letter he would carry to Castro are described by, among others, Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble.” Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy, 1958-1964. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997, 173-8. The quotation from the letter appears on p. 175. Given that no word had yet been uttered openly in the Kremlin about sending nuclear missiles to Cuba, the reference to “missiles and other arms” must have referred to conventional missiles.
The 12 May Khrushchev-Salinger meeting at a dacha outside Moscow is described by Michael R. Beschloss in The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991, beginning on p. 372. Beschloss uses the Jeyll-Hyde metaphor in these passages. Fursenko and Naftali also describe it at 176-7 without making that comparison. See also documents nos. 193, 195, and 196 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. V, Soviet Union. http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_v/190_199.html
Alexei Adzhubei, Khrushchev’s son-in-law, interviewed President Kennedy at the White House during and after a luncheon on 31 January 1962. He was accompanied by his wife Rada, Khrushchev’s daughter. See post 7 in this series, Triggering the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Kennedy’s statement to Stewart Alsop is discussed in the 9th post in this series, The Cold War’s Deadly Pitfall: Misunderstanding the Other Side.
Other versions of how and when Khrushchev reached his decision to send nuclear missiles to Cuba are discussed in the 15th post in this series, Khrushchev’s Nuclear Solution to His Many Problems.
Khrushchev’s 1959 deployment of MRBMs to the GDR is discussed in the 16th post in this series, A Closer Look into the CIA’s Cracked Crystal Ball.