Civilian Control of the U.S. Military: Part II

Thirtieth Chapter in a Series Chronicling the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962

In September 1961 the Senate Committee on the Armed Forces voted to investigate the Pentagon’s censorship of military officers’ speeches. (See Chapter 29 in this series: )

The Issues at Stake

An important issue underlay the censorship hearings: the tension between

• the “win-at-all-costs” approach to the Cold War of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations; and
• the Kennedy administration’s more flexible approach—on certain issues and under the right circumstances.

The Testimony: Defense SecretaryMcNamara

When he appeared before the full Senate Committee on September 6, 1961, McNamara explained that the recently dismissed Major General Edwin Walker had not only made “biased and inflammatory speeches” to his troops; he had also attempted to influence their and their dependents’ votes in the 1960 election through “the use of voting materials not obtained through military sources.” Both actions violated federal law.

McNamara then testified that (emphasis added)

“The military establishment is an instrument – not a shaper – of national policy. Its members – as free Americans – are entitled to their views on the issues of the day, and they have every right to try to make their views effective through the ballot.

“They do not have the right, however, to use the military establishment to advance partisan concepts or to alter decisions of the elected representatives of the people.”

Former Defense Secretary Robert A. Lovett

Lovett testified (in writing—emphasis added) that the constitutional principle that made the president Commander in Chief required

“that the military should be non-political and that career military officers should stick to their demanding profession and take no part in partisan activities…One of the most dangerous things which can happen to a government is to permit the establishment of a political party-line by officers on duty.”

Former and serving military officers

Those testifying in writing or in person included former President and General Dwight D. Eisenhower, former Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh Burke, retired General Omar Bradley, and retired Admiral Chester Nimitz.

While some of these distinguished, even legendary officers disliked having junior civilians censor their speeches, none of them challenged civilian control of the military.

Some of their testimony is summarized in the notes below.

Issues Settled? Yes…and No

YES: As of the end of January, the constitutional principle of civilian control of the military had been validated by civilian secretaries and supported by distinguished military officers. The necessary implication of this principle is that the military leaves politics to the civilians, including speeches and partisan political activity.

NO: By the time these protracted hearings ended in June, the question of official policy toward the Soviet Union remained unanswered. Was it to be the “win-lose, all-or-nothing” approach of hardliners, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other Pentagon brass? Or the more flexible, nuanced approach of the Kennedy administration and the civilians who ran the Pentagon?

• When an  “all-or-nothing” philosophy rules in an international crisis, military force is the last resort if one side will not cave in to the other.
• A nuanced solution to any Cold War crisis would seek to solve the crisis without resorting to military action and without compromising national security or the principles of American Democracy—if that could be accomplished. In the thermonuclear age, the unthinking use of military force can have unthinkable consequences.

The struggle between these two philosophies would boil over during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In the meantime:

Which of those philosophies would you have adopted had you been a Kennedy advisor in 1962?

mailto:phufstader@sbcglobal.net

Sources and Notes

The Doctrine of Separation of Powers also underlay these hearings: the principle that Congress cannot meddle with the executive branch’s personnel and programs. The military is part of the executive branch.

McNamara’s testimony is reported in Cabell Phillips, “Gen. Walker rebuke laid to political acts.” New York Times, 7 September 1961, p. 1. For more on Major General Edwin Walker’s dismissal, see Chapter 29 in this series (link above).

Former Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett’s testimony is printed on p. 18 of The New York Times of 23 January 1962.

Eisenhower’s statement was printed on p. 24 of The New York Times of 24 January 1962. He basically called for a voluntary program of censorship except when national security was at risk.

Excerpts from Admiral Burke’s testimony appeared on the same page.

When asked about Eisenhower’s comments at a 24 January press conference, President Kennedy remarked, “President Eisenhower is entitled to hold his views and express them. … I thought Mr. Lovettt and these other three military hit it so precisely that I strongly endorse what they said and I’m filled with appreciation of the fact that three distinguished members of the military said it.” Kennedy’s remark is quoted in Jack Raymond’s article cited just below.

Chief of Army Research and Development, Lt. Gen. Arthur Trudeau was highly critical of what Times reporter Jack Raymond called “the policy of authorizing civilians of junior rank to edit speeches by senior military officers.”

Nonetheless, Trudeau “affirmed his belief in civilian control of the military and the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense and higher officials ‘to review for policy and propriety, the statements of military spokesmen.’ ”

Trudeau’s testimony is quoted from Jack Raymond’s “At odds with Eisenhower, Kennedy backs talk curb.” New York Times, 25 January 1962, p. 1. The Times published a separate article containing examples of statements in Trudeau’s speeches that had been changed by government agencies. “Examples of changes made in Trudeau’s speeches.” 25 January 1962, p. 16.

Other distinguished officers testified, most of them in support of civilian control of the military, notably retired General Omar Bradley; General Lyman Lemnitzer, the current chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; General Frederic H. Smith, testifying on behalf of Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis E. LeMay; Admiral George Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations; and General David M. Shoup, Commandant of the Marine Corps. Unlike other officers, Anderson apparently thought that public education was a responsibility of the military.

During the hearings a fight broke out over McNamara’s refusal to divulge the names of the Pentagon’s censors. He would disclose other information, including the statements they had censored, but not the censors’ names. President Kennedy eventually instructed McNamara to invoke executive privilege in denying the names to the Stennis Committee. The President and the Secretary reasoned that the censors were merely implementing administration policy. The committee could interrogate their boss (McNamara) but not those who worked for him.

 Contemporary news analysts commented that this struggle over names evoked memories of the 1950s Congressional witch hunts for Reds led by Senators Joseph McCarthy and William Jenner, as well as the various chairs of the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

The censorship hearings were eventually assigned to a subcommittee chaired by Sen. John Stennis, D-Mississippi.  The Stennis hearings, which also covered troop indoctrination, dragged on until June, kept alive largely by Senator Strom Thurmond’s desperate attempts to turn them into a political victory for hardliners like himself. He was sometimes the only committee member present—again evoking memories of McCarthy’s 1953-1954 reign of terror. See Chapter 29 for more on Thurmond’s role in these hearings (link above).