Day Six of the Cuban Missile Crisis: Nearing the Rubicon

Eightieth Chapter in a Series Chronicling the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962

Author’s note: From October 16th to the 28th, the cascade of events we call the Cuban Missile Crisis will far outstrip this blog’s power to follow them in detail. The chapters covering this period focus on highlights of the most dangerous thirteen days in modern history.

And because the crisis ran 24/7, including weekends (when this blog does not publish), we must work slightly ahead of events in order not to fall hopelessly behind them.

Sunday, October 21st, 1962

USS Oxford intercepts a radar signal from a strategic missile site in Cuba. The National Security Agency (NSA) concludes that at least one Soviet regiment is ready to launch its missiles.

10 AM: The President gives final approval for the quarantine of Cuba. Kennedy also directs the USAF Tactical Air Command (TAC) to prepare to carry out air strikes any time after Monday morning, October 22.

11:30-@12:30: President Kennedy meets with the Attorney General, Joint Chiefs Chair General Taylor, General Sweeney, USAF, and the Secretary of Defense to discuss preparations and timing for possible attacks Cuba. General Sweeney (and the Joint Chiefs) still favor an attack Monday morning. Bobby Kennedy, Director of Central Intelligence John McCone (who joins the meeting late), and McNamara continue their opposition to a surprise attack because it smacks of Pearl Harbor and because the Soviets’ reaction is unpredictable.

2:30 PM: Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) George Anderson tells the National Security Council (NSC) on how the Navy will implement the quarantine:

"… each ship approaching the quarantine line will be signaled to stop for boarding and inspection. If the ship does not stop, a shot will be fired across the bow. If there is still no response, a shot will be fired into the rudder to cripple the vessel. When President Kennedy expresses concern that such an action might unintentionally destroy the [vessel], Anderson reassures the President that it is possible to cripple a ship without sinking it."

According to CNO’s history of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the quarantine might escalate:

"First would come the limited blockade [quarantine], then a complete blockade. If these failed to achieve the removal of the offensive weapons, the next step would be selective air strikes, followed finally by the implementation of one of two invasion plans…The last contingency was general war, which might result from extreme Soviet reaction."

As Kennedy concludes the NSC meeting, he says that despite almost-certain threats in the days ahead, “the biggest danger lay in taking no action.”

Later in the day: News of a crisis is spreading. White House Press Secretary Pierre Salinger receives four calls during the day. The President and Defense Secretary McNamara call the editors in chief at the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the New York Herald Tribune to ask them to sit on their stories. They agree.

Military preparations include preparing SAC bombers for dispersal to airfields around the United States and over seas.  An armada of support ships is being sent to East Coast troop embarkation and loading ports; the Canal Zone and Puerto Rico are being strengthened against attacks. Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) is ready to transfer the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (8,000 officers and men) to Commander in Chief Atlantic (CINCLANT) in 21 ships of Amphibious Group 3. Naval forces are positioned to protect shipping in the three choke points that make Cuba geopolitically significant: the Florida Straits, the Yucatan Channel, and the Windward Passage (between Cuba and Haiti).

Political preparations include locating and flying key members of Congress to Washington for a briefing by the President at 5 PM local time on Monday.

A large number of complex diplomatic preparations have to be dealt with on this last full day before the White House tells the world that the Soviets have smuggled missiles into Cuba while lying for months that they weren’t (from the CNO History, reformatted for emphasis):

• “The State Department sent top-secret telegrams to our Ambassadors describing proposed actions.
• “The text of the President's speech with covering letter to Mr. Khrushchev was sent to the Embassy in Moscow for delivery to the Soviet Foreign Office one hour before the President's public address.
• “Presidential letters were sent to Prime Minister MacMillan, President de Gaulle, Chancellor Adenauer, Prime Ministers Nehru [India], Diefenbaker [Canada], and Fanfani [Italy], Berlin's Mayor Brandt, and others through our Embassies for delivery.
• “The text of the President's speech was sent in code to all posts, and individual letters from the President were sent to 43 heads of government. (During the weekend, the State Department transmitted 45 separate Presidential letters or other documents to a total of 441 recipients.)”

The CIA sends instructions to all its Chiefs of Station around the world concerning developments in Cuba. The instructions conclude, “To anticipate every contingency, request that you immediately and quietly take necessary action place your station in position possible emergency situation. Imperative action you take not cause undue attention. More specific instructions will follow as appropriate.”

At the End of Day Six

Michael R. Beschloss points out that the President’s actions have ensured himself and EXCOM six days in which they could deliberate out of the public eye. This time was crucial to insuring a balanced rather than a hasty approach to the crisis.

Beschloss comments that no future American President in a similar quandary would ever enjoy the luxury of such a long and uninterrupted period for deliberation.

At noon Monday the White House will announce that the President will give an important address to be broadcast from the Oval Office at 7 PM that evening.

Tomorrow’s chapter will cover the events occurring before the President began to speak on Monday, October 22nd, 1962.

Monday’s chapter will look at what the President actually said. This chapter will contain a link to a video of the full speech.

Email your questions to phufstader@sbcglobal.net or post a comment.

Sources and Notes

The Rubicon is the river in northern Italy which Julius Caesar crossed in 49 BC on his way to confront his rival Pompey in Rome. Crossing that river would lead either to Caesar’s triumph or his death. “Crossing the Rubicon” has ever since meant making a momentous decision from which there can be no turning back.

Oxford’s detection of the SS-4 MRBM radar signal is described on p. 296 of Norman Polmar and John D. Gresham, DEFCON-2: Standing on the Brink of Nuclear War during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2006.

JFK’S approval of the quarantine is described on p. 376 of Lawrence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, eds., The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Document Reader. New York: The New Press, 1998.  (James Blight et al place this meeting at 11:30 AM. Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002.)

The 11:30 meeting referred to in the body of this chapter is described in document 36 in Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath (http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/frusXI/26_50.html).

The minutes of JFK’s 2:30 meeting with NSC appear as document 38 of the same volume of FRUS XI (link just above).

CNO Anderson’s words are quoted on p. 376 of Chang and Kornbluh and in the CNO History of the Crisis: Chief of Naval Operations, “Advance Preparatory Action, 2-21 October.” The Naval Quarantine of Cuba. http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq90-5.htm#anchor445839.

JFK’s and McNamara’s phone calls to editors are described on p. 376 of Chang and Kornbluh.

The “military preparations” enumerated in this chapter, and many others not listed, are described in detail in The CNO history of the Crisis: Chief of Naval Operations, “Advance Preparatory Action, 2-21 October.” (Link above.)

The list of diplomatic preparations completed on the 21st comes from The CNO history of the Crisis: Chief of Naval Operations, “Advance Preparatory Action, 2-21 October.” The Naval Quarantine of Cuba. (Link above.)

The CIA’s instructions to Chiefs of Stations around the world may be found in document 77 in McAuliffe, Mary ed., CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962. Washington, D.C.: October 1992.

Michael R. Beschloss’s comments appear on p. 470 of his The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991.