Moscow and Washington Trade Warnings: Mid-September 1962

Fifty-eighth Chapter in a Series Chronicling the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962

The Soviet Warning: September 11, 1962

On September 7th, President Kennedy asked Congress for authority to call 150,000 U.S. armed forces reservists to active duty because of steadily mounting tensions between Washington and Moscow.  The request was widely interpreted as an attempt to silence recent Republican charges that his administration was ignoring the Soviet military buildup in Cuba.

The White House said, however, that the request was motivated by the Soviet Union’s threats concerning Berlin, not its military activities in Cuba.

On September 11th, Tass, the Soviet “news” agency, warned the United States that any U.S. attack on Cuba or on Soviet vessels bound for Cuba could lead to war.

A September 12 memo prepared by the CIA’s Office of Current Intelligence said the statement was worded to credit the USSR with “protecting Cuba” if no invasion occurred.

With the clarity of hindsight, we can see that the Tass statement’s focus on U.S. belligerence was yet another maskirovka tactic to conceal the true goal of the Soviet buildup in Cuba: the establishment of strategic missile bases there.

Kennedy’s 2nd Warning to the Kremlin

On September 13th, President Kennedy dismissed recent charges by the Soviet Union and Cuba that the United State was intending to invade Castro’s island. Kennedy then added detail to his vague warning of September 4th (emphasis added):

"If at any time the Communist build-up in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our security in any way, including our base at Guantanamo, our passage to the Panama Canal, our missile and space activities at Cape Canaveral, or the lives of American citizens in this country, or if Cuba should ever attempt to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force against any nation in this hemisphere, or become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies."

Kennedy also said:

"If the United States ever should find it necessary to take military action against communism in Cuba, all of Castro's Communist-supplied weapons and technicians would not change the result or significantly extend the time required to achieve that result."

On September 14th, the Senate authorized the President to call 150,000 reservists to active duty and to extend active duty tours for a year if circumstances required it while Congress was recessed. The House was expected to pass the same legislation.

The Situation in Cuba: Mid-September 1962

Warnings: As of September 15th, President Kennedy had twice warned that if Cuba threatened other nations in the Western Hemisphere, or if the USSR deployed offensive weapons in Cuba, the United States would take whatever action was needed to protect itself and its allies. He had placed no upper limit on those actions.

Nukes arrive in Cuba: Neither the President nor his aides could have known that the first shipment of Soviet medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) had arrived in Cuba on or about September 8th. A second shipload was about to dock.

Kennedy’s requirements for U.S. military action against Cuba had therefore been fulfilled: the Soviets had deployed offensive weapons in Cuba. Only the United States’ failure to discover those missiles was protecting Kennedy from fulfilling his pledge: “This country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies."

Important Questions as of Sept. 15, 1962

• Would the United States discover those missiles before they were operational?
• If it did, would Kennedy fulfill his pledge?

If the U.S. did not discover those missiles, then their presence would be announced by Khrushchev during his November visit to the United States.

Under these too-awful-to-contemplate circumstances, a final question arises:

• What would Kennedy do then? What could he do?

Kennedy Requests New Intelligence Estimate

Shortly after his September 13th statement, Kennedy asked his aides for a National Intelligence Estimate on Cuba. The most recent estimate was dated August 1st .

As of September 15th, however, the curtailed photo reconnaissance of Cuba approved by Kennedy was ten days old. The estimators would have no recent photography of Cuba’s interior to help them assemble their new estimate.

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Sources and Notes

President Kennedy’s request for authority to activate reservists was covered by E. W. Kenworthy, “President Seeks Right to Call Up 150,000 Reservists.” New York Times,  September 8, 1962, p. 1. This request made headlines in all major American newspapers.

The Soviet Government warning of the 11th was covered by and reprinted in major American newspapers on September 12th. See, for example, Seymour Topping, “Kennedy Assailed. Moscow Asserts Bid to Call Reserves is Aggressive Step.” New York Times, p. 1. The Soviet statement was printed on p. 16 of this issue.

The CIA’s September 12th Current Intelligence Memorandum is printed as document 422 in Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume X, Cuba: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/frusX/421_443.html .

Kennedy’s second warning was made at a press conference at the State Department. His warning, quoted above, comes from document 429 in Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume X, Cuba. Use the link above.

This is the New York Times September 14th coverage of Kennedy’s news conference:

• E. W. Kenworthy, “OAS to get Plans. Castro Tries to Prop Crumbling Regime, President Asserts,” p. 1.
• Edward Tetlow, “A Picture of Cuba Today. A Reporter Finds People Listless about Growing Soviet Influence—Food Shortages Cause More Concern,” p. 1.
• Hanson W. Baldwin, “Cuban and Russian Arms. Soviet Warning against U.S. Attack Called Move to Gain Time for Castro,” p. 13.
• The text of the President’s news conference was printed on p. 12.

Similar reports appeared in the Boston Globe, the Chicago Daily Tribune, the Hartford Courant, the Los Angeles Times, and the Wall Street Journal.

Kennedy’s request for a new National Intelligence Estimate is described on p. 144 of Dino Brugioni’s Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of The Cuban Missile Crisis (Robert F. McCort, ed.). New York: Random House, 1991.

For an analysis of the August 1st intelligence estimate, see chapter 40 in this series: ).

For an analysis of how photo reconnaissance of Cuba was curtailed, see chapter 57 in this series: .