The CIA Gets It Wrong—for the Third Time

Paragraph D in SNIE 85-3-62

On September 19, 1962, the U.S. Intelligence Board approved the release of the intelligence estimate President Kennedy had requested a few days earlier (see chapter 58 in this series: http://avon.patch.com/blog_posts/moscow-and-washington-trade-warnings-mi...).

Special National Intelligence Estimate 85-3-62 contains a glaring error in judgment in Paragraph D (emphasis added):

"D. The USSR could derive considerable military advantage from the establishment of Soviet medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba, or from the establishment of a Soviet submarine base there.…Either development, however, would be incompatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it. It would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in US-Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed thus far, and consequently would have important policy implications with respect to other areas and other problems in East-West relations." (Paras. 29-33)

The CIA Explains Paragraph D

Para. 31 backs up Paragraph D. with this reasoning (emphasis added; my critiques appear in italics):

1. “…such weapons have so far not been installed even in Satellite territory. Serious problems of command and control would arise.”

(Translation: the Kremlin feared that strategic missiles deployed in “Satellite territory” might be seized by an uprising and fired back into the Soviet Union.)

Two problems with this reasoning: a) In 1959, the Soviets briefly deployed strategic missiles in East Germany, undoubtedly a Soviet satellite, and the U.S. intelligence community knew about the deployment. In other words there was a precedent for placing strategic missiles outside Russia. b) In the unlikely event that Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba were seized by a popular uprising (almost impossible to imagine), they could not reach Russia. That Kremlin worry did not apply to the Cuban deployment.

 2. “The Soviets might think that the political effect of defying the US by stationing Soviet nuclear striking power in so menacing a position would be worth a good deal if they could get away with it. However, they would almost certainly estimate that this could not be done without provoking a dangerous U.S. reaction.”

Problem: Khrushchev in 1962 was desperate for a foreign policy victory. His Cuban adventure might, in one blow, give him several victories. A desperate man might well take this risk of “a dangerous US reaction” if the benefits to him (should he “get away with it”) were tempting enough.

Further Critiques of the CIA’s Paragraph D

It is fascinating that the CIA’s Sherman Kent and his colleagues recognized “the considerable military advantage” the Soviets could derive from missile bases in Cuba—and then dismissed the possibility because they believed, erroneously, that the Soviets had never done such a thing before. Even if the USSR hadn’t ever deployed its strategic missiles outside Russia’s borders, isn’t there always a first time? And shouldn’t the CIA have realized that MRBMs and IRBMs, with ranges of 1,100 and 2,200 nautical miles respectively, could not possibly reach the USSR from Cuba?

Further: In May 1961, President Kennedy read a CIA profile describing Khrushchev as (emphasis added) “a gambler and a dissembler, expert in calculated bluffing. … While priding himself on his realism and particularly his mastery of the realities of the balance of power, he is imbued with the idea that he can utilize Soviet power to move the world toward communism during his lifetime.” Could the CIA have forgotten its own appraisal of Khrushchev’s willingness to take risks?

Further yet: It is also remarkable that the CIA, of all organizations, seemed to know so little about the pressures Khrushchev had been under from the Presidium to produce foreign policy “wins,” particularly over Berlin. In my view, that pressure, plus Khrushchev’s character as an “expert in calculated bluffing,” added up to a leader more than willing to risk a direct confrontation with the United States to get what he desperately needed. See Chapter 4 in this series, Soviet Leader under the Gun (http://avon.patch.com/blog_posts/nikita-khrushchev-soviet-leader-under-t...).

Cassandra Dissents—Yet Again

From his rose-strewn honeymoon bower on the French Riviera, Director of Central Intelligence McCone dissented yet again with his own analysts and forecasters. His TOP SECRET September 20 cable to Deputy Director Carter reads (emphasis added),

"…STRONGLY SUGGEST MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO CONCLUSION LAST SENTENCE PARAGRAPH D. AS AN ALTERNATIVE I CAN SEE THAT AN OFFENSIVE SOVIET CUBAN BASE WILL PROVIDE SOVIETS WITH MOST IMPORTANT AND EFFECTIVE TRADING POSITION IN CONNECTION WITH ALL OTHER CRITICAL AREAS AND HENCE THEY MIGHT TAKE AN UNEXPECTED RISK TO ESTABLISH SUCH A POSITION."

McCone had defined that “trading position” at a State Department policy-makers’ meeting on August 21, 1962 (emphasis added):

“If I were Khrushchev, I would put MRBMs [Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles] in Cuba and I would aim several at Washington and New York and then I would say, ‘Mr. President, how would you like looking down the barrels of a shotgun for a while. Now, let’s talk about Berlin. Later, we’ll bargain about your overseas bases.’ … That’s the kind of situation that we can be faced with in the future, and we had better do some planning for it.”

Truer words were never spoken. But no one ever believes Cassandra—until that wooden horse is inside the gates. Then it’s too late.

Email your questions to phufstader@sbcglobal.net or post a comment.

Sources and Notes

Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 85-3-62 basically repeated the predictions of two previous estimates, namely NIE 85-62 (March 21) and NIE 85-2-62 (August 1st). The full text of SNIE 85-3-62 is printed as document 433 of Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume X, Cuba (http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/frusX/421_443.html).

The 1959 Soviet deployment of two strategic missile regiments in East Germany is discussed in Chapter Sixteen in this series (http://avon.patch.com/blog_posts/a-closer-look-into-the-cias-cracked-cry...).

The description of Khrushchev as “gambler and dissembler” appears on p. 167 of Michael R. Beschloss’s The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991. Beschloss cites as sources profiles of Khrushchev written by the CIA’s Office of Current Intelligence in 1959 and 1961.

McCone’s September 20th TOP SECRET cable to his deputy General Carter is document 34 in Mary McAuliffe, ed., CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962. Washington, D.C.: October 1992.

McCone’s “barrels of a shotgun” remark is quoted by Dino Brugioni on p. 96 of his Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of The Cuban Missile Crisis (Robert F. McCort, ed.). New York: Random House, 1991. Brugioni cites as his source an August 19, 1970, interview with John McCone in the Oral History collection at the John F. Kennedy Library.

Cassandra was the daughter of King Priam and Queen Hecuba of Troy. Though Cassandra had the power of prophecy, Apollo, whom Cassandra had spurned, had caused all her prophecies to be disbelieved until after they had come true. Thomas Bulfinch, Mythology: the Age of Fable, the Age of Chivalry, Legends of Charlemagne. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1970, p. 916.