The Cold War’s Deadly Pitfall: Misunderstanding the Other Side

Ninth in a Series Chronicling the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962

The Danger of Misunderstanding

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union repeatedly misunderstood each other’s words, actions, and intentions. The danger of misunderstanding increased exponentially when one side did not carefully think through the implications of what it said and did.

In the thermonuclear age, carelessness can have unthinkable consequences.

The Alsop Interview

In late March 1962, political commentator Stewart Alsop quoted President Kennedy’s off-hand observation, made during an interview: “…Of course in some circumstances, we must be prepared to use the nuclear weapon at the start, come what may—a clear attack on Western Europe, for example. But what is important is that if you use these weapons you have to control their use.”

Even when it vetted Alsop’s article for publication, the White House failed to anticipate that the Kremlin would interpret “at the start, come what may” as a U.S. threat to mount a nuclear first strike. That error came quickly home to roost.

 At a 29 March news conference, Kennedy tried to backpedal: “A so-called preemptive attack on its own part is not our policy nor the policy of previous administrations.”

The Kremlin Spins Kennedy’s Words

It was too late to backpedal, however.

In its attack on Kennedy, Pravda, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, ignored the context of Kennedy’s remark: he had framed the U.S. use of nuclear weapons as a possible response to an attack on Western Europe initiated by the USSR. In Pravda’s skewed version, Kennedy had declared that the United States “was ‘entitled to strike the first atomic blow, to become the initiator of a war of aggression.’ ”

Could Khrushchev Sincerely Believe that Kennedy was Threatening the USSR?

Consider these factors:

• During centuries of turmoil, Russians have learned to see threats and plots lurking beneath the most innocent-appearing surfaces. Russians have themselves become experts at maskirovka (“denial and deception”).
• Khrushchev had not only survived purges and plots; after Stalin died in 1953, he had helped engineer the trial and execution of secret police chief Lavrenti Beria, his rival to succeed Stalin.
• Khrushchev had crushed a 1956 uprising in Hungary with Soviet tanks and infantry.
• For Khrushchev, therefore, the use of force was as natural as breathing.
• Yet the Russian people had suffered terribly during World War II. The last thing Khrushchev and his Kremlin colleagues wanted was another world war, especially a nuclear one.
• Khrushchev had already interpreted Kennedy’s January reference to Hungary as a subtle warning not to interfere in Cuban affairs—or else.

Given those factors, therefore, Khrushchev could easily have interpreted Kennedy’s recent statement as yet another warning: “Don’t even think about kicking us out of Berlin. We’ll nuke you if you do.”  That warning he could not ignore.

Crunch Time for Khrushchev

Threats, boasts, bluster—nothing had worked. Not only had the Allies refused to leave Berlin—now they were threatening Khrushchev with a nuclear holocaust if he tried to force them out. The U.S. was poised to invade Cuba, and they had told him “Hands off!” there as well. The final insult: the U.S. had openly flaunted its nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union.

As April 1962 loomed, Khrushchev ‘s back was against the Kremlin’s wall.

Email questions and comments to phufstader@sbcglobal.net or comment on the blog!

Sources

Alsop’s article on his interview with Kennedy is titled “Kennedy’s Grand Strategy.” The Saturday Evening Post, Vol. 235, Issue 13, pp. 11-15. 31 March 1962. My downloaded pdf version of this article is missing one page.

The transcript of Kennedy’s 29 March 1962 news conference was printed on p. 12 of The New York Times of 30 March.

Pravda’s response to Kennedy’s injudicious remark was reported by Seymour Topping on p. 1 of The New York Times of 1 April 1962.  The quotation above from Pravda is from Topping’s article.

Khrushchev’s response to Kennedy’s words is discussed by Michael R. Beschloss in The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991, 371ff.

Khrushchev’s response is also discussed briefly in Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble.” Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy, 1958-1964. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997, at 177.

For a fascinating study of the Soviet use of maskirovka in the Cuban Missile Crisis, see James Hansen’s “Soviet Deception in the Cuban Missile Crisis: Learning from the Past.” Hansen’s paper is part of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Studies in Intelligence series. cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol46no1/article06.html.