Triggering the Cuban Missile Crisis

Part 7 of a series chronicling the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962

All Crises are Triggered by an Event

Sometimes the trigger event is unmistakable: Pearl Harbor, for example.

Sometimes the trigger event passes unrecognized, even by those who participated in it. The trigger event can be as simple as one leader misunderstanding a statement by another.

Indeed, understanding and interpreting the words and intentions of other nations have been the perpetual challenges for foreign policy decision-makers throughout history — as they are today with respect to Iran’s nuclear intentions.

These problems were particularly acute during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the stakes could not have been higher. Throw in the Russian, Spanish, and English languages; add the volatile Castro and the gambler Khrushchev to the nuclear mix—and who knew what might happen?

The Izvestia Interview

On Jan. 30, 1962 President Kennedy was interviewed in the Oval Office by Alexei Adzhubei, Khrushchev’s son-in-law and editor of the Soviet newspaper Izvestia.

After Adzhubei returned to Moscow, he told Khrushchev that Kennedy had said something during the interview that only Khrushchev should know about: during their discussion of U.S. intentions toward Cuba, Kennedy had reminded Adzhubei that the U.S. had not intervened when Khrushchev had used Soviet tanks to crush a 1956 uprising in Hungary.

What did Kennedy actually say about Hungary to Adzhubei? How accurately did Adzhubei report Kennedy’s words? We can’t be sure.

Adzhubei’s Report is the Trigger

Though the precise sequence of events is unclear, around Feb. 15, 1962 Moscow sent Castro a copy of Adzhubei’s report of the interview, including Kennedy’s reference to Hungary. Castro later told French reporter Jean Daniel, “It was this report which triggered the whole situation.”

It is not clear whether it was Khrushchev or Castro who first interpreted Kennedy’s reference to Hungary as this deliberate warning to the Soviet Union: don’t interfere if the U.S. invades Cuba!

Whichever it was, Khrushchev at some point asked Castro what the Cubans needed to make the Americans hold their hand.  Castro’s answer, as told to reporter Daniel: “Do whatever is needed to convince the United States that any attack on Cuba is the same as an attack on the Soviet Union.” The two leaders then discussed “a proclamation, an alliance, conventional military aid.”

Castro told Daniel that the Kremlin eventually concluded that if the USSR provided only conventional (non-nuclear) military aid to Cuba, the U.S. “might not hesitate” to invade. If the U.S. did invade, the Soviets would retaliate and a world war would break out.

So where did that leave Khrushchev and Castro? If conventional  military aid would not prevent a U.S. invasion of Cuba, what else could provide the deterrent?

Do you have any questions or comments? Email phufstader@sbcglobal.net or post a comment under this blog post.

Sources:

For commentary on the Adzhubei interview and subsequent events, see

Beschloss, Michael R. The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev 1960-1963. New York: Edward Burlingame Books (an imprint of Harper Collins Publishers), 1991, 361-2.

Fursenko, Aleksandr and Timothy Naftali. “One Hell of a Gamble.” Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997, 151-3.

For Alexei Adzhubei’s verbatim account of his Oval Office interview with Kennedy, see Adam Mayle,  “Adzhubei’s Account of his Visit to Washington.” In author’s possession. Download from the National Security Archive, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/. Use the search engine and key word “adzhubei.”

Jean Daniel’s two articles (print copies of both in author’s possession):

“Unofficial Envoy: An Historic Report from Two Capitals.” The New Republic, 14 December 1963, 15-20.

“Interviews with Kennedy and Castro: Further Clarification.” The New Republic, 21 December 1963, 6-7.